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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of wage indexation on the optimal degree of central bank conservativeness in a 
dynamic economy. In particular, we find that when unemployment persists, wage indexation is inflationary as it lowers 
the will of the central banker to fight inflation. Furthermore, we show that there is a positive relationship between the 
degree of the monetary authorities'' discount factor and inflation. We conclude that it is optimal to delegate monetary 
policy to an independent and conservative central banker.
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     1. Introduction
In a seminal paper Rogoﬀ (1985) showed that it is optimal to delegate monetary policy
to an independent and conservative central banker, that is, a central banker that is not
inﬂuenced by politicians and places a greater weight on inﬂation vis-` a-vis the government.
This delegation reduces the inﬂationary bias of monetary policy that arises in the Barro-
Gordon (1983) framework. Rogoﬀ’s proposal is supported by a series of empirical studies
that often ﬁnd a negative relationship between central bank conservativeness and inﬂation
across countries; see Cukierman et al., (1993), Alesina, (1988), Grilli et al., (1991), among
others.1
However, the model that Rogoﬀ develops is a static one while it is shown in the
relevant literature that output and unemployment are persistent; see Nelson and Plosser
(1982) and Alogoskouﬁs and Manning (1988). Taking into account this stylized fact many
authors examine central bank independence when there is persistence in the economy.
With persistence, Rogoﬀ’s result may be invalid. In particular, Lockwood et. al. (1998)
show that with unemployment persistence, delegating monetary policy to an independent
central banker is not always desirable.
Extending the Rogoﬀ framework, a series of authors have embedded wage index-
ing into the relevant literature of time inconsistency in monetary policy. Mourmouras
(1997b) shows that wage indexation is inﬂationary in the sense that it weakens the will
of government to ﬁght inﬂation and delegates monetary policy to a central banker that is
less inﬂation-averse than in the original Rogoﬀ model. Hutchison and Walsh (1998) ﬁnd
similar results and show that, in a closed economy, a greater degree of central bank con-
servativeness will increase nominal rigidity resulting in a ﬂatter short run output-inﬂation
trade-oﬀ.
In this paper we examine the eﬀect of wage indexation on central bank conservative-
ness in a dynamic setting. In particular, we examine the case where unemployment is
characterized by persistence. To the best of our knowledge this has not been previously
examined in the literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the theoretical
model. In Section 3 we solve the model and provide the main results. Section 4 concludes.
2. The Model
The model is built around Lockwood et. al. (1998) and extended to allow for indexed
wage contracts as in Gray (1976) and Fischer (1983).
Labour demand is given by:2
lt = pt − wt − εt (1)
where lt is labour, pT is the price level and εt is a random iid labour shock.
The trade union’s loss function is as follows:
Q
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where Ω > 0 is the real wage target and lu
t is a moving employment target.
1However, Franzese (1999) argues that these linear-additive models are misspeciﬁed and concludes
that the anti-inﬂation eﬀect of central bank independence is nonlinear.
2All variables are in logs.
1The assumed trade union employment target follows that of Linbeck and Snower
(1986), Blanchard and Summers (1986) and Alogoskouﬁs and Manning (1998). In partic-
ular, the employment target of the union (Qu
t) is the weighted geometric mean of those
insiders who have been recently employed (Lt−1) and the total labour force (N). Thus,
Lu
t = La
t−1N1−a where 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. Taking logarithms we have:
l
u
t = alt−1 + (1 − a)n (3)
where a in eﬀect measures the trade union’s power, that is, how much it inﬂuences
employment vis-` a-vis outsiders. The union minimizes its loss function Qu
t (2) subject to
its employment target lu
t (3) and labour demand lt (1). This yields the optimal expected
real wage (˜ lu
t ):
wt − Et−1pt = (1 − θ)Ω − θl
u
t = −˜ l
u
t (4)
We assume that wage contracts are indexed and therefore, the actual nominal wage
is determined by:
˜ wt = Et−1wt + ζ(πt − π
e
t) (5)
where πt is the actual rate of inﬂation, Et−1 = πe
t are inﬂation expectations and ζ is the
wage indexing parameter which is exogenous (ζ ∈ [0,1]).3
Combining (4) and (5) we have:
wt − p
e
t = (1 − θ)Ω − θl
u − ζ(πt − π
e
t) = Etwt (6)
Combining (4) and (1) gives us the deviation of employment from its target:
lt − ˜ l
u
t = pt − Et−1pt − εt = πt − Et−1πt − εt (7)
where ˜ lu
t is the union’s eﬀective employment target. Using (7) and (6) gives us the rate
of unemployemt:
ut = n − lt
= (n − ˜ l
u
t ) + (˜ l
u
t − lt)




where ut is the level of unemployment, ρ = θa which is the degree of unemployment
persisitence (ρ ∈ [0,1]) and un = (1 − θ)(n + Ω)/(1 − ρ).
















As in Rogoﬀ (1985) the government and the central banker have diﬀerent weights on
inﬂation (λ  = λcb) but they share the same inﬂation and unemployment targets which
are assumed to be zero. The dynamic loss functions are given as:
3The wage indexing rule used here is very common in the literature (e.g. Gray, 1976; Fischer, 1977;




















where δ < δcb. 4
The timing of events is as follows:
1. The government appoints an independent central banker and optimally sets her
degree of conservativeness (λcb).
2. Wage setters set the nominal wage (wt).
3. The stochastic labour shock is realized (εt).
4. The central banker optimally chooses the rate of inﬂation (πt).
5. Equilibrium employment is determined (lt).
3. Solving the Model
3.1 Discretion
At ﬁrst we examine the case where the government does not delegate monetary policy
to an independent and conservative central banker and sets itself the level of inﬂation.
The model presented here is a dynamic game where the state variable is lagged unemploy-
ment.5 This type of game has been previously studied by Lockwood and Philippopoulos
(1994).6
We focus only on the perfect equilibrium where the current actions of the players at
time t, namely (pt, wt), depend on the game history only through the state variable ut,
often known as Markov-perfect equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) in the game
theory literature. This restriction rules out punishment strategies which could be used
to sustain a reputation for low inﬂation as in Barro and Gordon (1983).
Wage setter’s form rational expectations for the level of inﬂation:
π
e
t = Et−1πt (13)
The government’s expected present discounted value of losses from t + 1 onward can
be characterized by:











t + δV (ut) (15)
subject to (13) and (8). Solving this minimization problem yields:
4It has been argued that central banker’s tend to serve longer terms than government (Lockwood et.
al., 1998) and therefore will have relatively higher discount factors.
5Whether the game is dynamic when a > 0 and repeated when a = 0.
6One minor diﬀerence is that the state variable in Lockwood and Philippopoulos (1994) is labour lt
while in this setting it is unemployment ut.
3− 2(1 + ζ)ut + 2λπt − δ(1 + ζ)β1 − δ(1 + ζ)β2ut = 0 (16)
Rearranging the above equation we can derive the government’s feedback rule:








(2 + δβ2)(1 + ζ)
2λ
(19)
Combining (13) with (19) we have:
ˆ πt = φ0 + φ[(1 − ρ)un + ρut−1] + sεt (20)
where s =
φ
1+φ. Combining the above equation with (8) gives us:
ˆ ut = (1 − ρ)un + ρut−1 + (1 − s(1 + ζ))εt (21)
The coeﬃcients in the central banker’s function are determined by the below equation:
V (ut−1) = Et−1[ˆ u
2
t + λˆ π
2
t + δV (ˆ ut)] (22)
Equationg terms in ut−1 and u2






2 + 2b2δ(2 + λ + 2ζ) + 4(1 + λ) = 0 (23)
b1 =
(−1 + ρ)ρun(4(1 + λ) + b2δ(b2δ(1 + ζ)2 + 2(2 + λ + 2ζ)))
2λ(−1 + δρ) + δρ(1 + ζ)(2 + b2δ(1 + ζ))
(24)
Equation (23) has real roots only if:
λ > 4ζ(1 + ζ)
in which case it has two real roots. Lockwood and Phillipopoulos (1994) argue that the
equilibrium associated with the smaller root to (23) has some nice properties, whereas
the other equilibrium is badly behaved. In what follows, we take the smaller root to (23).
We can summarize as follows:
Proposition 1. With discretion, inﬂation is given by a rule (φ0, φ, s) whose components
must satisfy (18), (19), (20), (23), (24).
3.2 Delegation
We examine the case where monetary policy is delegated from the government to
an independent and conservative central banker with preference parameter λcb. One
again the outcome for inﬂation, which is a Markov-perfect equilibrium, where inﬂation is
characterized by (18), (19), (20), (23), (24) where λ is replaced by λcb and δ is replaced
by δcb (δ < δcb).
To see the eﬀect of wage indexation on inﬂation we substitute φo (18), φ1 (19),and s






(b1 + b2[r(ut−1 − un) + un +
4eλ2
cb
[2(1 + λcb) + b2δcb(1 + ζ)]2]) (25)
4Proposition 2. Wage indexation is inﬂationary (∂π/∂zeta > 0).
Proof: Equation (25) is always positive if ρ(ut−1 − un) + un > 0. We can rewrite this
as ut−1 + (1 − ρ)un and as 0 < r < 1 and un > 0 this is always positive and therefore
∂π/∂ζ > 0.7
Proposition 3. A higher discount factor (δ) leads to less inﬂation (∂π/∂δ < 0).






(b1 + b2[ρ(ut−1 − un) + un +
4eλ2
cb
[2(1 + λcb) + b2δcb(1 + ζ)]2]) < 0 (26)
Therefore inﬂation is reduced when monetary policy is delegated to an independent
central banker. The central banker (on average) serves a longer term than the government
and therefore will have a higher discount factor (δ < δcb).
Proposition 4. The more conservative is the monetary authority, that is, the higher
parameter λ is, the lower inﬂation is.




(1 + ζ)[b1δ(1 + ζ) + (2 + b2δ(1 + ζ))]
2λcb




[2(1 + λcb) + b2δcb(1 + ζ)]2] > 0
(27)
Therefore, as ∂π/∂λ < 0 by delegating monetary policy to a conservative central
banker (λcb > λ) inﬂation is reduced.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we examined the eﬀect of wage indexation on the degree of central
bank independence when unemployment persists. We conclude that wage indexation
is inﬂationary. This is consistent with the relevant literature which mainly focuses on
static one-period models. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that a higher discount factor leads to
less inﬂation and therefore it is optimal to delegate monetary policy to an independent
and conservative central banker. Finally, we ﬁnd a negative relationship between the
conservativeness of the central banker and the level of inﬂation.
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